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Executive summary 
• It is widely recognised that environmental restoration and conservation challenges go 
beyond what can be financed publicly and there are significant opportunities for private 
investment in the delivery of public goods, benefitting both commercial organisations 
whose business relies on ecosystem services, as well as landowners, land managers 
and the general public. Thus, public-private financing of natural capital improvement 
presents an opportunity to increase the availability of funding for payments for 
ecosystem services that provide environmental and societal benefits.   
 
• Public-private partnerships for the financing of ecosystem services is in its infancy in 
the UK. Several schemes are in the theoretical stages of development, or in the early 
stages of developing trades. However, the number of public-private partnerships and 
the ecosystem services market is increasing in scale and scope. 
 
• This research explores the voluntary ecosystem services market in the UK. It does this 
by identifying key actors involved in payment for ecosystem services schemes, trading 
platforms and supporting modelling tools. This is achieved by developing an 
understanding of how these actors operate, and by identifying possible synergies, 
examples of good practice and challenges to implementation.  
 
• Topics covered include, understanding how the identified actors account for the social 
distribution of ecosystem services, how values are attributed to ecosystem services, 
and the legal obligations linked to ventures’ operation.  
 
• An online review of the UK's ecosystem services market was conducted, identifying 
several UK public/private schemes and partnerships, as well as platforms and 
modelling tools that facilitate the delivery of and act as a driver of the UK's voluntary 
ecosystem services market. These are collectively referred to as 'ventures' throughout 
the report. In-depth interviews were conducted with two ecosystem services schemes 
(the Woodland Carbon Code (WCC) and the Peatland Code (PC)), two stakeholder 
engagement initiatives (Landscape Enterprise Networks (LENs) and the Natural 
Infrastructure Scheme (NIS)), the trading platform EnTrade and biophysical modelling 
tool, Viridian Logic.    
 
• We find that organisational structures that ensure transparency and reduce the 
potential for power asymmetries are important for successful implementation (p.7).  
 
• Farmer/landowner engagement presented a challenge for all ventures. Treating 
farmers/landowners as equal transactional partners was recognised to be fundamental 
in ensuring a long-term commitment to the delivery of mutually beneficial ecosystem 
services (p.8). 
 
• Additionality presents a concern, with potential for private investment to stall if it is not 
possible to demonstrate (through evidence) that interventions would not happen 
without it. Stakeholder engagement initiatives need to supply more evidence on 
achieving additionality, perhaps adopting similar additionality tests to that used by the 
Woodland Carbon Code and Peatland Code schemes (p.18).  
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• Explicit integration and consideration of the wider social distribution of ecosystem 
services was low and there is limited evidence that the ventures are actively 
considering the wider social distribution of the ecosystems services or defining wider 
beneficiaries of the public goods that they deliver (p.10). 
 
• The value of a given ecosystem service across all schemes was negotiated between 
demand and supply side actors based on market demand and ‘willingness to pay’ 
(p.14). However, for LENs and NIS which consider a range of public goods, the 
quantification of benefits is still challenging.  
 
• The legal instruments used to deliver each scheme varied within and between ventures, 
with direct contracts used in most cases. Ventures were mindful that binding legal 
arrangements (e.g. environmental covenants) could be a barrier to participation but 
recognised that contracts needed to be both robust and flexible, particularly in the case 
of long-term landscape interventions where suppliers and/or the interventions may 
change over time (p.16).  
 
• Understanding how ventures operate and the synergies and differences between 
different schemes, trading platforms and stakeholder engagement initiatives will 
support better integration of public and private finance within ecosystem markets, 
broadening the range of outcomes and the scale at which these can be delivered. 
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Definitions 
Additionality 
Additionality refers to the additional impact of interventions, an activity is deemed ‘additional’ if 
it would not have happened in absence of the payment provided by the PES system (English 
Partnerships, 2008). 
Aggregator 
A business/organisation or individual that negotiates on behalf of a group of suppliers or buyers. 
Ecosystem market 
Commercial market for the trade between demand and supply side actors 
(farmers/landowners) in ecosystem services with environmental and societal benefits. 
Ecosystem services 
The benefits that we derive from the natural environment and include, for example, the 
provision of food, water, timber and fibre; the regulation of air quality, climate and flood risk; 
opportunities for recreation and cultural development; and underlying functions such as nutrient 
cycling (Smith et al., 2013). 
Ecosystem services venture 
Collective term used to refer to all actors in the ecosystem services market. Including, 
ecosystem services schemes, stakeholder engagement initiatives, platforms and modelling 
tools that facilitate the delivery of and act as a driver of the UK's voluntary ecosystem services 
market.   
Marketplace 
The enabling conditions and mechanisms to support the sale and purchase of ecosystem 
services, fundamental to which, are the public and privately funded payment for ecosystem 
services schemes and marketplaces that pool funding from a range of sources to pay 
farmers/landowners for the delivery of ecosystem services delivering a range of environmental 
outcomes with societal benefits.  
Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) 
‘PES schemes involve payments to the managers of land or other natural resources in 
exchange for the provision of specified ecosystem services (or actions anticipated to deliver 
these services) over-and-above what would otherwise be provided in the absence of payment. 
Payments are made by the beneficiaries of the services in question, for example, individuals, 
communities, businesses or governments acting on behalf of various parties. Beneficiaries and 
land or resource managers enter into PES agreements on a voluntary basis and are in no way 
obligated to do so.’ (Smith et al., 2013, p.9) 
Public-private finance 
Obtaining funds from multiple sources, including public funding, philanthropic donation and 
private investment (i.e. business to whom the landscape is core to business operations), to 
increase the availability of funding for ecosystem services. 
Stakeholder engagement initiative 
A scheme that can be classed as an immature scheme due to still being under development 
and being not yet fully operationalised. In this report, stakeholder engagements initiatives can 
be in various stages of development.  
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APR Agricultural Property Relief 
BPR Business Property Relief 
BPS Basic Payment Scheme 
CAP Common Agricultural Policy 
CSR Corporate Social Responsibility 
Eftec Economics for the Environment Consultancy 
EIA Environmental Impact Assessment 
ELS Entry Level Scheme 
ELM Environmental Land Management 
CSS Countryside Stewardship Scheme 
ES Ecosystem Services 
GERG Government’s Environmental Reporting Guidelines 
GHG Green House Gas 
HLS Higher Level Stewardship 
ICROA International Carbon Reduction Offset Alliance 
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
LENs Landscape Enterprise Networks 
NIDC Natural Infrastructure Delivery Company 
NIS Natural Infrastructure Scheme 
OFG Organic Farmers and Growers 
PC Peatland Code 
PES Payment for Ecosystem Services 
SDG Sustainable Development Goals 
SSSI Sites of Special Scientific Interest 
WCC Woodland Carbon Code 
UKAS United Kingdom Accreditation Service 
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
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1 Background 
Climate change represents one of the most pressing global challenges of our time.  Agriculture 
is a key contributor of greenhouse gas emissions, land degradation and reduced soil and water 
quality, placing significant pressures on the landscapes in which they are embedded (Willet et 
al., 2019; Committee on Climate Change, 2020). Climate action and sustainable land 
management represent key Sustainable Development Goals (SGD) (see SDG 13 ‘Climate 
Action’ and SDG 15 ‘Life on Land’) (United Nations, 2020) and land managers and farmers are 
recognised to have a fundamental role to play in the delivery of ecosystem services and 
activities that deliver environmental outcomes (‘public goods’) alongside production 
imperatives. Such interventions include activities that improve soil health, air and water quality, 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions, provide carbon sequestration, flood mitigation as well as 
deliver conservation and habitat restoration outcomes. There is growing recognition of both 
public and private responsibilities and business cases for the financing of ecosystem services 
that deliver ‘public goods’ and sustainable landscapes upon which multiple stakeholders rely.  
In the UK, public funding of rural development and agri-environment activities have largely 
been financed via ‘Pillar 2’ of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The CAP has received 
heavy criticism for prioritising agricultural productivity to the detriment of the environment, with 
a lack of consideration on the need to reduce climate change stress on ecosystems, with 
conservation accounting for only a small proportion of CAP’s overall budget (Allen and Hart, 
2013). To date, conservation and regeneration of English and Welsh rural landscapes has been 
delivered by landowners and farmers primarily via a two-tier ‘Countryside Stewardship 
Scheme’ (CSS), within which operates the ‘Entry Level Stewardship’ (ELS) and the ‘Higher 
Level Stewardship’ (HLS) scheme. As voluntary schemes, financial incentives are offered to 
farmers and landowners to deliver environmental services that enhance local landscapes and 
ecosystems, although adoption has been low (Defra, 2018a). Low levels of engagement have 
been influenced by a number of factors, including the direct payments received under ‘Pillar 1’ 
of the CAP, that have acted as a disincentive to the delivery of public goods, and bureaucratic 
barriers, for example overly prescriptive options as well as complex and burdensome 
application and monitoring processes. The available options are often seen as unfitting for the 
geographic context or individual farm, and the levels of compensation underestimate farmers’ 
real or perceived losses (Smith et al., 2003; Wilson and Hart, 2000).  
The UK’s withdrawal from the EU (and therefore the CAP) presents an opportunity to re-
orientate land management in the UK, with greater focus on the delivery of sustainable 
landscapes - a principle referred to as ‘public money for public goods’ in the public sector 
(Defra, 2020). Public funding for the delivery for ecosystem services will be channelled via post-
Brexit agricultural payments schemes such as those set out in the Agriculture Bill 2020 and the 
proposed Environmental Land Management scheme (ELMs) for England. Replacing the CSS, 
ELMs, alongside the gradual elimination of direct payments, aims to transform the agricultural 
sector by rewarding land managers and farmers for the delivery of public goods, essentially, 
paying land managers and farmers to adopt more environmentally sustainable farming 
practices and enhance natural capital. However, it is recognised that whilst environmental 
restoration and conservation challenges go beyond what can be financed publicly, there are 
significant opportunities for the commercialisation of the delivery of natural capital (Defra, 
2018b) benefitting both commercial organisations, whose services rely on landscapes, as well 
as farmers and land owners. 
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2 Research purpose 
A broad range of public-private partnerships have emerged in the UK that seek to harness 
natural capital from landscapes whilst also providing vital conservation services. The focus on 
business-to-business transactions, facilitated by such ventures, has the potential to improve 
farmer and landowner engagement with PES schemes and support the sustained delivery of 
ecosystem services. Private investment may therefore operate increasingly alongside public 
financing to support the delivery of sustainable and multi-functional landscapes. Understanding 
the UK PES market and its actors is particularly pertinent given the significant changes in 
agricultural policy as a result of the UK's withdrawal from the European Union, and the 
important role that PES is expected to play in driving a productive and sustainable agricultural 
sector. This is of particular relevance to a range of actors including agricultural policymakers, 
those developing PES schemes, and farmers/landowners, and in articulating future research 
directions for both academia and government. Specifically, the research aims to:  
Understand how different UK privately funded PES schemes and facilitating platforms operate 
by; 
1. Exploring the synergies between different privately funded PES schemes in the UK; 
2. Understand if and how UK privately funded PES ventures account for: 
a. how values are attributed to ecosystem services;  
b. the social distribution of ecosystem services; 
c. the legal obligations or challenges surrounding the implementation of ventures. 
The research adopted a two stage design. In Stage 1, an online review of the UK's ecosystem 
services market was conducted to map the UK's PES landscape and evaluate the quality of 
publicly available information regarding privately funded PES schemes and the market based 
mechanisms that operate in the UK’s ES market. Two schemes, two stakeholder engagement 
initiatives, a facilitating platform and a biophysical modeller that are prominent contributors to 
the delivery of the UK’s ES market (collectively referred to as 'ventures') were identified and 
selected as the focus of this research (see Figure 1). In stage 2, each venture was contacted 
and a nominated representative of each was interviewed to explore the issues outlined above. 
Figure 1: UK Ecosystem market ventures (research focus). 
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This research aims to enhance understanding of how UK PES ventures are structured and 
operate. An improved understanding of the ventures and facilitators of ES markets will help 
improve the system and ultimately increase the supply of ecosystem services. Based on the 
findings of the research we reflect upon the contributions of private financed PES ventures 
within the UK payment for ecosystem services market and make recommendations on how the 
private financing within the UK’s PES system could be advanced. 
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 3 Methodological approach 
The research adopted a two stage design. In Stage 1, a review of UK ecosystem markets was 
conducted and scoped online to determine the extent and quality of publicly available 
information regarding the UK’s market for ES, and PES or PES like ventures. The review 
identified a number of categories of actors that facilitate the delivery of ES in the UK, this 
included PES schemes that provide financial reward for the delivery of a range of ES schemes, 
such as, Defra Biodiversity Credit Metric 2.0, used in Biodiversity Net Gain/ No Net Loss 
policies (Biodiversity offset Credits), Wessex Water’s scheme for cover crops (Nitrogen 
credits), Affinity Water’s scheme for Oil Seed Rape Substitution (Pesticide Credits) and United 
Utilities’ Maize under-sowing scheme (Nitrogen Credits). The review identified two PES 
schemes for further analysis, the Woodland Carbon Code (WCC) and the Peatland Code (PC). 
The PC and WCC were selected as case studies for further analysis (Stage 2) as they represent 
the first voluntary standards for woodland creation and peatland conservation and 
management in the UK and have enabled conditions for a market for carbon sequestration.  
Stakeholder engagement initiatives were identified that seek to identify demand within a 
landscape for assets and generate commercial interest in buying ES, as well as facilitating 
supply networks to fulfil demand. The Natural Infrastructure Scheme (NIS) and Landscape 
Enterprise Networks (LENs) were examples of such initiatives and were included in the analysis 
as illustrations of a framework for the delivery of a broader range of ES. 
Platforms that facilitate and act as a driver for the overall voluntary ES market were also 
identified.  EnTrade was identified in the review process as creating a market for ES beyond 
carbon sequestration. EnTrade provides a mechanism that allows farmers to propose land use 
change, to convert this into environmental credit (using the rules of schemes) and then broker 
contracts and payments for those credits, between land managers and credit buyers via an 
online marketplace. The review identified other platforms operating in this space, including for 
example, Nature Bid. Finally, modellers were identified as supporting the implementation and 
delivery of payment for ecosystem service schemes, by for example, modelling landscapes 
and identifying need for ecosystem services, optimal positioning of interventions, and 
beneficiaries within a given landscape, and included tools such as, InVEST, EcoServ-GIS and 
Co$ting Nature. Viridian Logic was identified for inclusion within the second stage of the 
research owing to their links with the PES ventures identified, and therefore, the insights that 
they were able to provide regarding working with these actors. A synopsis of each actor 
identified in Stage 1 and included in this research, is presented in Table 1. This includes 
identification of the number of operational projects and those in the planning process.  
Following identification, a more comprehensive analysis of the existing information available 
online for each actor was undertaken. This analysis was framed by seven questions:  
1. Who is involved in the venture (organisations)?  
2. Is there private and/or public funding involved?  
3. Who makes decisions and what is the decision-making process?  
4. What is the history of the venture?  
5. How do farmers engage with the venture?  
6. What are the specifics of the venture (e.g. payments and options)?  
7. What is the experience of the venture so far?  
The findings from this scoping exercise were used to guide discussions with three subject-
specific experts (Professor Julia Ortega, Professor Chris Rodgers and Dr Gordon Mitchell) 
regarding the complexities of environmental justice, economics and valuation, and law within 
ES markets. Information generated via conversations with experts in combination with the 
output of the initial scoping work were then used to inform the development of a semi-structured 
interview guide. An overview of the discussion guide is shown in Table 2. 
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 Woodland Carbon Code (WCC) 
Voluntary standard for the UK woodland creation projects that sequester carbon. The code encourages a 
consistent approach to woodland carbon projects, providing a transparent platform for engaging private 
investment of carbon unit trading. It provides assurances to purchases that carbon sold is real, measurable and 
additional. 
Started: 
 
Scheme 
launched in 
2011 
Projects in 
operation: 
Projects 
validated: 241 
Projects in 
planning: 
Projects 
registered but 
not yet 
validated: 152 
Contact details: 
info@woodlandcarboncode.org.uk 
www.woodlandcarboncode.org.uk 
 
Peatland Code (PC) 
Voluntary certification standard for UK Peatland restoration projects. Provides a platform for engaging private 
funding in the purchase of ecosystem services and climate benefit, emanating from peatland restoration. The 
code sets out best practice requirements and a standard method for the quantification of GHG benefit and 
provides buyers assurances that the climate benefits being sold are real, quantifiable, additional and 
permanent.  
Started: 
Officially 
launched in 
2015 after a 
pilot phase 
Projects in 
operation: 
Projects 
validated: 4 
Projects in 
planning: 
A further 6 
projects which 
are registered 
and with others 
in the pipeline 
Contact details: 
info@iucn.org.uk 
www.iucn-uk-peatlandprogramme.org 
 
 
Landscape Enterprise Network (LENs) 
A regionally focused approach that harnesses commercial interest in the function of the landscapes on which 
their businesses rely and coordinates commercial investment into strategic assets, such as soils, hydrology of 
landscapes, and habitats.  
Started: 
Scheme started 
2016 
Money flow - 
2018 
Projects in 
operation: 
8 (2 active 
trades and 6 in 
the negotiation 
process) 
Projects in 
planning: 
4 
Contact details: 
Tom Curtis 
Tom.Curtis@3keel.com 
www.LandscapeEntperiseNetworks.com 
 
Natural Infrastructure Scheme (NIS) 
A theoretical avoided cost-based model to harness commercial investment in the delivery of natural flood 
management. Brings together demand and supply side actors to procure natural flood management 
interventions that are monitored and maintained for up to 15 years.  
Scheme currently in development (no active trades)  Contact details: 
ga@green-alliance.org.uk 
www.green-alliance.org.uk 
  
Table 1: Case study overview (information accurate May 2020). 
(a) PES Schemes 
(b) Stakeholder engagement initiatives 
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 EnTrade 
EnTrade facilitates online marketplaces through a platform and associated services for the sale of 
environmental services to business. It provides a transparent platform for the trade of environmental service 
that pools finances from public, private, and philanthropic sources. The online marketplace aids the discovery 
of optimal prices for the delivery of specific environmental outcome and identifies farmers/landowners in 
specific locations that can deliver the outcome at the specified price. 
Started: 
2016 
Projects in 
operation: 
As of May 2020, 
29 marketplaces 
have been run 
across 10 
locations 
Projects in 
planning: 
20 further 
markets 
planned for 
2020-21, 
covering 10 new 
locations 
Contact details: 
David Baxter 
David.Baxter@EnTrade.co.uk 
www.EnTrade.co.uk 
 
Viridian Logic  
Biophysical modelling service that provides natural flood management and ecosystem support solutions that 
can be applied to valuation, planning and decision support to identify what interventions should be done and in 
what locations. 
Started: 
2017 
Projects in 
operation: 
5 
Projects in 
planning: 
6 (estimated) 
Contact details: 
Angus Middleton 
angus@viridianlogic.com 
www.viridianlogic.com 
 
  
(c) Trading platforms and modelling support 
In Stage 2, each of the respective ventures were contacted by email to request a semi-
structured telephone interview. The discussion guide was shared so that they could prepare in 
advance and self-elect a representative to participate. Semi-structured telephone interviews 
were conducted with a representative from each of the respective ventures. Interview notes 
were compiled to aid analysis and were used as the basis for synthesis. The final report was 
shared with participants in order to ensure that it was an accurate reflection of their responses. 
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 Section number Section title Question areas 
Section 1  Background information  
Understand how the venture operates, specifically: 
• Decision makers and decision-making process 
• Public funding 
• Land manager and farmer interaction 
• Interventions 
• Land manager/farmer compensation 
• Digital methods/technologies to facilitate interaction 
• Challenges 
• Difficulties resolved 
Section 2 
Social distribution of 
ecosystem services 
Understand the distributive effects of interventions adopted, 
specifically; 
• How are beneficiaries identified 
• How does the venture evaluate and balance the needs 
of different beneficiaries? 
• Consideration of social distributive effects on different 
populations 
• Identification of impacts of different population groups  
• Arrangements for measuring impacts 
Section 3 Economics/valuation 
Understand how the valuations placed on ecosystem services 
were identified, specifically; 
• Conceptualisation of the ecosystem service and their 
values 
• What valuation approach is used and who makes the 
valuation (i.e. primary data, benefit transfer) 
• Definition of payments 
Section 4 Legal issues 
Understand the legal structures surrounding the implementation 
of AES, including; 
• Legal ‘vehicle’ for scheme delivery 
• Additionality of outcomes 
• Legal enforceability 
• Legal arrangements i) adequate ii) flexible iii) robust 
• Monitoring and evaluation 
• Long-term delivery mechanisms 
Section 5 Other viewpoints Complementary/alternative viewpoints 
 
  
Table 2: Stage 2 interview discussion guide 
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4 Findings 
Responses were collectively reviewed by the authors, with commonalities and important 
aspects extracted to form a synthesis of the interview data. The following sections represent 
the responses of participants and therefore, reflects the individual perspectives of those 
interviewed regarding their individual venture, how they operate and the contributions that they 
make to the UK’s ES market. 
4.1 Venture backgrounds 
4.1.1 Decision making and the decision-making process 
The decision-making structures varied across each scheme and stakeholder engagement 
initiative. The WCC and PC are administered by executive boards and guided by advisory 
committees comprised of external experts and stakeholders. The PC is owned and 
administered by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN)’s UK Peatland 
Programme. The WCC executive committee comprises of forestry authorities of the devolved 
administrations of the UK and is administered by the Scottish Forestry commission on behalf 
of the UK. Executive committees manage the day-to-day running, with advisory boards 
consulted regarding any developments of the respective venture.  
In contrast to the WCC and the PC where landowners/farmers initiate the project development 
process and sale process, both LENs and NIS are initiated by demand side need, presenting 
potential for power asymmetries. Within LENs, decision making is driven by demand and supply 
side consortia, facilitated by aggregators as part of trading transactions, although driven 
principally by the supply chain needs of demand side actors. It was suggested that as LENs 
develops, power may become more balanced between demand and supply side actors within 
landscapes as supply side actors are supported to come forward with asset propositions. In 
both Cumbria and the river Avon catchment (Hampshire), where LENs has active partnerships, 
LENs were moving towards establishing a ‘regional entity’ to balance power and ensure 
accountability for the development and brokering of LENs trades. 
At the time of interviewing, the NIS was in theoretical development, similarly to LENs proposed 
the creation of an independent entity they refer to as ‘a natural infrastructure delivery company 
(NIDC)’ comprised of stakeholders from both the demand and supply side, as well as wider 
stakeholders, to preside over decision making, relationships, and legalities, addressing the 
potential for power asymmetry. Within EnTrade and Viridian Logic, decision making resided 
with the respective trades, schemes, systems and markets that they supported. It was not clear 
from the data which structure was most effective, although, interviewees suggested that 
structures that ensure transparency and reduce the potential for power asymmetries are likely 
to be important.  
4.1.2 Involvement of public funding 
Public funding can be leveraged in the development of a venture, in projects applying to be 
part of a venture and in the day-to-day management of these. Public funding had been 
leveraged in the original scheme development of the PC, WCC and NIS. For the PC, public 
funding is not required, as projects can be fully financed privately, although in practice this is 
rare. Public funding can be used for 100% of the capital costs of peatland restoration work but 
a proportion of additional funding must be required and secured through private funding to 
make the project meet additionality criteria (see Box 2) in line with greenhouse gas accounting 
rules. Under the Peatland Code, up to 85% of total costs can be leveraged from public sources. 
Within the WCC, projects can combine public and private funding, but the financial additionality 
tests (Box 2) must be passed in order to demonstrate that the project would not have proceeded 
in the absence of the private carbon funding. NIS and LENs were exploring potential and 
desirability of integrating public funding with private via post-Brexit agricultural payments 
schemes as part of an ongoing Defra Test and Trials project in Cumbria.   
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In LENs, public funding has supported initial consortium development. Public funding is used 
to fund the management of the PC and WCC. For the WCC this was used by Scottish Forestry 
staff to manage/develop the WCC and provide governance. For the PC, grants from Defra and 
the devolved administrations were used to support PC staff within IUCN UK Peatland 
Programme. Public funding also enables both the PC and WCC to conduct further research 
and supports the provision of a transparent carbon unit registry. 
4.1.3 Farmer/land owner engagement 
Farmer/landowner interactions varied across the ventures. Within the WCC, PC and EnTrade, 
initiatives on the ground were used to stimulate farmer/landowner interest and awareness and 
stimulating engagement, encouraging farmers/landowners to develop project propositions and 
register on the respective online platforms. Projects could be developed independently or be 
supported by project developers. This is very different to stakeholder engagement initiatives 
(LENs and NIS) where interest in developing trades is generated from the demand side. Within 
LENs and NIS, farmer and landowner engagement was facilitated by the development of supply 
side consortia supported by supply aggregators and/or proposed delivery companies to 
facilitate consortia development and support the negotiation process. Across the schemes 
there was a recognition of the need for dialogue with ‘supply side’ actors (namely farmers/land 
owners), treating them as business partners and giving them a primary role in developing trade 
as well as taking care to ensure that schemes are not prescriptive in their requirements. 
Treating farmers and landowners in this way was perceived by interviewees to be important to 
give farmers and landowners autonomy. Within the PC and the WCC, farmers/landowners had 
the ability to define their own projects with or without the assistance of project developers. In 
both instances a project’s scope was not influenced by purchasers other than the need to 
deliver specified amounts of carbon. Within LENs and NIS interventions were defined by the 
requirements of the market, whilst farmers/landowners did not have a role in determining 
demand, the approaches promoted collaboration and were co-developed with 
farmers/landowners as suppliers of ES to ensure the acceptability of options.  
4.1.4 Farmer compensation for interventions 
All schemes were voluntary open marketplaces and the level of compensation for interventions 
were negotiated between the supplier and buyer, with prices driven by demand. The exception 
is for the Woodland Carbon Guarantee in England where the government offers a contract for 
the option to sell Woodland Carbon Units to them via an auction. The WCC noted that increased 
demand for carbon offsetting had resulted in significant increases in the price per tonne of CO2. 
The WCC determines price on a one-to-one basis between supplier and buyer. WCC projects 
can run for 100 years and there is no minimum length, but rotation lengths dictate a typical 
minimum of 45 years for a conifer clear fell project or 65-75 years for a native woodland project 
with minimum intervention. Peatland Code projects can last 30-100 years. Given the length of 
projects in both the PC and WCC, farmers/landowners are able to sell carbon upfront or within 
the first few years of the project, although the farmer/landowner responsible for delivery has to 
ensure capital for long-term maintenance, monitoring and verification. Within LENs and NIS, 
the supply aggregator acting as a broker on behalf of the supply side actors 
(farmers/landowners), negotiates a deal with demand side actors for the delivery of 
interventions. Currently, it appears that there is no consensus on the ‘best’ compensation 
mechanism; payments could vary by types of intervention/measure, and be paid up-front, 
yearly, or as revenue payments over-time. Variation in payment may be necessary, as the 
‘best’ solution is likely to be dependent on the nature of individual transactions. 
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4.1.5 Digital mechanisms and technologies 
EnTrade is continually developing their platform, guided by the market and the needs of clients. 
The online platforms can be customised for individual schemes and respond directly to demand 
for the types of technical requirements of the schemes. 
The WCC and PC use digital mechanisms to support their joint project registry, the primary 
mechanism for ensuring transparency, with every tonne of carbon sold, or available for sale, 
made visible in real time. The decision to share a registry was taken to enable cost sharing 
between the two schemes. There was a recognised role for digital technologies to support self-
monitoring and verification of established projects, although this did not eliminate the role of 
site visits and manual verification of project delivery, which was noted to be particularly 
important at the start of projects. Within an active LENs trade located in Cumbria UK, 
farmers/landowners are able to evidence that they have undertaken an intervention by 
uploading evidence to a web portal owned by the demand side consortia. The web-portal is 
unique to the scheme operating in Cumbria and currently LENs does not support project 
evaluation or verification centrally. 
4.1.6 Challenges and difficulties  
Supply side 
There are challenges reported from both buyers and sellers (farmers/landowners) in the 
development of their respective ventures. On the supply side, farmer/landowner engagement 
was a pertinent issue for all ventures. Specifically, the schemes (PC/WCC) reported lacking 
data, such as contact details of relevant farmers to engage, challenging their ability to extend 
schemes at scale. There was therefore a need to engage with the farmers via alternative, often 
resource intensive means, e.g. on-the-ground staff or private aggregators. For peatlands, 
publicly funded landscape scale facilitators drive engagement with Scottish Government’s 
Peatland Action restoration programme, and it is anticipated that Defra’s Nature for Climate 
Fund will employ similar facilitators to drive engagement with publicly funded restoration 
options in England. Within LENs and NIS, supply side challenges were identified around 
willingness and ability to self-organise, cooperate with others to offer joint services and 
willingness to take on the risk of delivering interventions. The NIS (based on an avoided cost 
model) identified potential supply side concerns regarding failure to deliver contracted 
outcomes. This highlighted the importance of the role of intermediaries to support collaboration 
and represent the collective interests of supply side actors.  
There was an awareness that ventures should avoid being overly prescriptive in terms of the 
interventions and importance of treating farmers as business partners in order to avoid them 
feeling demoralised or disenfranchised, leading to suboptimal outcomes. Treating 
farmers/landowners as equal transactional partners was recognised as being fundamental to 
ensuring long-term commitment to the delivery of mutually beneficial ecosystem services. 
Ventures identified a reluctance from farmers to sign up to long-term agreements; this was 
particularly problematic for the WCC and PC which require permanent and long-term land use 
change commitments. There are concerns from landowners that peatland restoration under the 
PC could lead to areas of wetland and scrub that would: i) not be eligible for, although soon to 
be retired, Basic Payment Scheme (BPS) payments; ii) not be eligible for Agricultural Property 
Relief (APR) or Business Property Relief (BPR), increasing liabilities under Inheritance Tax 
law; and iii) lead to designation of Sites of Special Scientific Interest (SSSI), leading to 
increased statutory obligations and commitments on the land.  
Demand side  
On the demand side, for LENs, NIS and EnTrade, sensitivities around the freedoms and 
willingness of businesses to share financial data to enable the establishment of consortia was 
identified as a challenge to the establishment of initial co-procurement arrangements. 
Additionally, many businesses were reluctant to pay for interventions that farmers/landowners  
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should be doing as part of compliance and/or that could be paid for by public finance. Changes 
in the UK’s agriculture policy as a result of withdrawal from the European Union and the 
introduction of the post-Brexit agricultural payments schemes, such as ELMs in England, was 
perceived to present further market uncertainties. Finally, the PC and WCC are currently limited 
to quantifying climate mitigation benefits, although there is potential to expand the delivery 
model in order to account for multiple ecosystem service benefits.  
4.2 Economics and valuation 
4.2.1 Ecosystem services and their values 
Within the WCC and the PC, the identification of direct units (e.g. carbon equivalents) are 
guided by the latest available science and units are often defined by a regulatory requirement 
needed for compliance. The price attributed to units are driven by demand and buyers 
‘willingness to pay’ and is specific to each project. The price is determined in a 1:1 deal, 
negotiated between each project developer and buyer, often via intermediaries. Market 
demand drives the price up when available carbon is low and when demand increases 
farmers/landowners hold out for higher prices. However, deals are only secured if a buyer is 
willing to pay the price offered by the supplier. In contrast, there are more limited quantities of 
peatland restoration projects for sale and these have wider associated benefits than just 
carbon. Consequently, peatland carbon commands a price premium. It was recognised that 
some buyers might be interested in the unique characteristics of peatland carbon, whilst others 
may seek carbon credits without an interest in the project from which they are created 
(Woodland Carbon Code, 2019a). 
LENs and NIS are similar in how they conduct valuations. Evaluations are conducted 
independently by demand side and supply side actors.  The value of a given ecosystem 
services is negotiated between both parties, from the demand side this represents an identified 
price and ‘willingness to pay’ for a given ecosystem service outcome and from the supply side 
the identified cost of delivery. In this sense it takes a price discovery approach, rather than 
relying on economic valuation. The NIS proposes a ‘market in avoided costs’, a project 
becomes viable where the cost to the potential beneficiaries (e.g. of flood repairs or hard flood 
defences) is greater than the cost to land managers of implementing measures on land (e.g. 
attenuation ponds and bunds) which would avoid the business as usual costs to beneficiaries. 
This creates a ‘trading space’ between the cost of business as usual, and the cost of 
implementing measures on the land. The parties negotiate an agreement for the delivery of the 
ecosystem service somewhere between these two values. In LENs, for example, their active 
trade in Cumbria (between Nestle, United Utilities and First Milk) represents a conventional 
bilateral price negotiation between the supplier (First Milk, acting on behalf of farmers) and a 
customer (Nestle/United Utilities).  
EnTrade provides a platform that helps determine the optimal process for delivering specific 
ecosystem services via its online market place. EnTrade operates reverse auctions and its 
twenty trades (e.g. marketplaces) to date, have taken a price discovery approach, with the 
competition between ‘suppliers’ (farmers/landowners) being more akin to a competitive 
tendering scenario (e.g. reverse auction). The synergistic relationship between the schemes 
and trading platforms is important to highlight. For example, LENs was key to partnership 
forming and creating engagement for the Hampshire Avon catchment. The buyers (Wiltshire 
Council and Wessex Water) then used EnTrade to negotiate joint contracts between the joint 
parties and the farmers. 
4.2.2 Use of valuation methods 
Each venture adopts different approaches and methods of valuation. The WCC and PC are 
similar as they are limited to the sale of carbon units, with prices defined by the market as 
outlined above. The PC can only sell emissions reduction benefits, i.e. units of carbon dioxide 
equivalent that would have been emitted to the atmosphere if restoration had not taken place. 
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The marketing of projects often includes the narrative of other benefits e.g. landscape, culture, 
biodiversity, water quality, etc. which are not quantified, but often given as justification for prices 
that are higher per tonne than the voluntary carbon market. For example, wider economic 
benefits analysis of the WCC was conducted by Economics for the Environment Consultancy 
(Eftec, 2016), although additional benefits are not sold, co-benefits of peatland restoration are 
used to justify the cost (per tonne of carbon) of some PC projects. 
LENs and NIS operate similarly and identified a sequence of evaluations that are conducted, 
building upon an understanding of businesses operational needs and the cost of delivery. 
Within LENs and NIS, valuations are conducted independently on the demand side and supply 
side. On the demand side this is based on an identification of a business need from the 
landscape, an understanding of where those needs are at risk from the environmental quality 
of the landscape and an estimation of how much a given outcome is worth to their business. 
On the supply side, farmers/landowners calculate their cost base (i.e. their minimum price for 
delivery of a given intervention) and this is the basis upon which price negotiations are 
conducted.  Both supply and demand sides have an informed idea of what constitutes a ‘good 
deal’ for them, although the extent to which this represents a formal valuation process is open 
to discussion. The NIS model is based on avoided costs; demand side payment is calculated 
based on costs experienced down-stream, for example, what real-life costs are being 
experienced by businesses as a result of flooding and the absence of an ecosystem service 
that is preventing flooding, how much of this cost could be avoided by a natural flood 
management intervention and what it would cost to landowners/farmers to implement this. The 
NIS is yet to test this in fully in practice (this is currently being explored in the Eden catchment), 
although in theory, businesses, infrastructure operators, and government agencies, should 
have an idea about their costs (i.e. building, improving and maintaining hard defences) and 
exposure to risk (i.e. likely cost of recovering from a flood event). In both cases the gap 
represents the trading space in which suppliers and demand-side actors can trade, where 
negotiations can take place and a price can be reached, which satisfies both parties. 
The metrics used by EnTrade to define values for ecosystem services are not defined by the 
platform but rather the client, such as those defined by WCC and PC. This gives greater 
flexibility within trades, as it allows the market to define the appropriate price for a given 
ecosystem service.   
Viridian Logic does not currently value benefits from natural interventions, although this ability 
is in development. Currently it identifies and ranks the efficiency of all interventions that could 
be implemented across landscapes, considering how much impact they would have on water-
related issues. It compares how much more or less effective an intervention will be compared 
to all the other options. This helps to ensure targeted deployment of appropriate interventions, 
offering farmers/landowners multiple options so that they can blend these theoretical answers 
with their practical knowledge of and preferences for their land. The ranking also allows 
payments to be scaled depending on how effective the interventions proposed by 
farmers/landowners are. For example, a hedgerow planted in the best place for mitigating 
phosphate pollution could cost more than the same hedge planted in a location where it will do 
little to help.   
4.2.3 Who conducts the valuations? 
Field survey and independent valuation (through validation and verification) can be conducted 
before a project starts. For LENs, NIS, WCC and PC this was reached via negotiations between 
demand and supply side actors. Deliberative monetary valuation has been conducted with 
sellers and interested local stakeholders for potential PC projects, incorporating capital costs, 
income foregone, ongoing maintenance, opportunity costs, time/labour costs and ecosystem 
service payments (Reed  et al., 2017). However, in practice, monetary valuation for the PC is 
typically conducted by a broker, with initial estimates made using project tools based on desk 
survey information. 
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4.2.4 Use of primary data 
All ventures currently used limited primary data for valuing ES. However, methodologies for 
projecting and verifying carbon sequestration and GHG emission reductions were developed 
in accordance with globally recognised standards in each case. For example, in the case of the 
WCC, the methodology for determining carbon sequestration units was derived from 
mechanisms used to underpin global standards (e.g. Gold Standard, the American Carbon 
Registry, Verified Carbon Standard and Clean Development Mechanism) adapted to the UK 
context. Methods for the PC were developed initially on the template of the WCC, but with 
significant adaptations to enable projects to estimate and then validate GHG emission 
reductions rather than carbon sequestration. This was done by developing emissions factors 
based on the analysis of GHG emission data from peatlands of different types and stages of 
degradation or restoration, in line with the UK’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) Tier 2 methodology used to calculate emissions in the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) GHG inventory. Within the PC and the WCC during 
the development stages and at the start of a project, validation is performed via on-site survey 
visits to assess the quality and condition of the land and inform the assessment of climate 
benefits that can be obtained, assess risks to the project and confirm the eligibility of project. 
For LENs and NIS, price negotiations could be based on data regarding the effectiveness of a 
given intervention and the value of a given service, based on published evidence of the 
effectiveness of an intervention (sometimes by proxy on the basis that it is included in existing 
agri-environment schemes). Evidence based for the effectiveness of interventions may not be 
robust. Research is being conducted to determine the effectiveness of some LENs 
interventions via the Resilient Dairy Landscapes project, which may inform future iterations of 
LENs.  
4.3 The social distribution of ecosystem services  
4.3.1 Beneficiaries 
Other than the identification of immediate beneficiaries of the ventures, there was limited 
evidence that they were actively considering the wider social distribution of the ecosystems 
services or defining wider beneficiaries of the public goods that they deliver, although, there 
was recognition of its importance in identifying regional societal benefits and supporting 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) goals. No ventures were directly considering or 
measuring the societal impacts of their initiatives or the interventions that were implemented 
as part of these. 
There was some evidence of this being integrated by compliance with broader standards in the 
respective scheme domains. For example, the WCC is compliant with the UK Forestry 
Standard (Forestry Commission, 2017) that sets out minimum standards on a variety of criteria 
including socio-economic factors (See Box 1).  Adherence to this meant that individual projects 
were not required to monitor or evaluate the social distributive effects, though there is a lack of 
consensus of whether meeting this standard could be improved. The WCC use the UK Forestry 
Standard as the ‘de minimis’ standard which aligns with international standards. It was 
recognised that the standard may change in the future and there may be more appetite for 
monitoring of the impacts of forestry creation on wider beneficiaries if, for example, this was to 
increase the sale price of carbon. The WCC also adopts a ‘Woodland Benefits Tool’ to provide 
a consistent way of evaluating the likely benefits of woodland creation in relation to four 
aspects; water, community, biodiversity and the economy. While the tool does not quantify the 
benefits delivered, it provides a consistent way of evaluating the likely benefits and relative 
merits of each project by allowing project developers to score their projects out of 5 for likely 
benefits to arise in the four respective aspects1. 
1 The Woodland Benefits tool can be found at: https://www.woodlandcarboncode.org.uk/standard-and-
guidance/5-social-responsibility 
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The lack of consideration of the social distribution of ecosystem services across the ventures 
was perhaps a factor associated with the level of development, for example NIS is in theoretical 
development and at the time of interviewing had no active trades, whilst LENs is in the early 
stages of application with 2 active trades and a further 6 at varying stages in the negotiation 
process. LENs is underpinned by the argument that driving multiple investments in multiple 
landscape functions makes landscapes more responsive to societal needs, however, the 
emergent outcomes (or their social distribution) are not currently measured. LENs were 
reportedly looking at the social impact investment potential within some of their peri-urban 
LENs trades that are currently being negotiated, specifically in Bolton and Bristol. The PC only 
stipulates the need for a ‘statement of environment’ in the management plans of projects, which 
can include the delivery of additional ecosystem services.  
Whilst not currently considered, there was recognised potential for further development and for 
ventures to include the identification of wider beneficiaries and monitoring of impacts for a wider 
range of stakeholders. The WCC and the NIS recognised the potential of ‘stacking’ (cumulating) 
multiple ES benefits, that would enable farmers/landowners to sell multiple ES from their land 
or a given intervention and therefore allowing the full value of land to be realised. The WCC 
have internally considered their position/approach regarding ‘stacking’ additional benefits along 
with WCC carbon. Whilst the integration of data of this nature was identified to be technically 
possible, concerns were raised that it may not be financially feasible to do so.  
The PC requires projects to identify, notify and consult relevant stakeholders or their 
representatives, where feasible, to account for potential trade-offs, for example in neighbouring 
properties, and although methods have been developed for PC projects to include multiple 
costs and benefits in a ‘fair price’, although this approach has not been used widely in practice.  
LENs recognised that delivering social benefits through market methods can be controversial 
and it requires good governance and debate. LENs adhered to the underlying Theory of 
Change, and is focused on delivering multi-functional landscapes, identifying private 
investment in landscapes that deliver benefits to the investor directly but also deliver multiple 
benefits for society, relying on two aspects of its design to achieve positive social impact and 
value: 
1. Through driving multiple investments in multiple landscape functions, LENs seeks to: 
(a) make landscapes more reflective of the complex needs of society; and (b) set up 
‘trade-offs’ and ‘checks and balances’ that reduce the risk of the adverse consequences 
of 'single outcome focused' land management systems.  This is in contrast to the status 
quo, where landscapes are driven and managed for an often narrow range of 
(commodity production oriented) outcomes, downstream impacts are paid for by other 
businesses or society, and wider landscape outcomes are treated as marginal 
considerations. 
2. The second means of securing social impact within LENs is via the establishment of 
locally accountable, non-profit-distributing, governance vehicles or ‘regional entities’, to 
develop and manage LENs trades and ‘curate’ the balance of trades within a region 
helping to reflect regional needs in an equitable manner. 
Both Viridian and EnTrade identified capacity within their analysis and platform for the inclusion 
of more sophisticated metrics for understanding the social distributive impacts of ecosystem 
services. Although possible, they had not been requested by the schemes. 
19 
   
Box 1: UK Forestry Standards 
The United Kingdom Forestry Standard (UKFS) is the reference standard for sustainable forest management 
in the UK and are divided into legal and good forestry practice requirements. The requirements are categorised 
into 8 elements (e.g. general forestry practice, biodiversity, climate change, historic environment, landscape, 
people, soil and water) each with supporting guidelines for forest managers. The social distribution of 
ecosystem services, as part of forestry projects, is considered under the guidance around ‘people’ and includes 
the following specific guidance: 
• Consider engaging with the local community by seeking their views, developing proposals that are 
responsive to them and building co-operative partnerships. 
• As part of the forest planning process, consider which individuals and organisations from all groups 
in society may have an interest in the formulation of forest management proposals, or something to 
contribute. 
• Aim to communicate forestry proposals and their operational impacts clearly; consider     presenting 
several options and try to accommodate local needs where they are compatible with management 
objectives. 
• Ensure all members of society, including hard-to-reach groups, those with protected characteristics 
and those who may not have been traditional users, are considered when planning the provision of 
access 
• Consider providing, or encouraging others to provide, opportunities for volunteering in woodlands, 
particularly from groups who would benefit most, such as young, old or disabled people, or those who 
have not traditionally used woodlands. 
• Consider the potential for developing sustainable woodland-based businesses and livelihoods and 
how this might be explored with interested parties and through local co-operation. 
Source: adapted from The UK Forestry Standard, Forestry Commission (2017). 
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4.3.2 Balancing needs between companies and society 
Consideration of the balance between companies and society was not explicitly defined by 
most ventures. LENs reported this to have been addressed through driving multifunctional 
landscapes as well as allowing government (central or local) to procure outcomes via the LENs 
network, either in public-private LENs value chain consortia, or as their own discrete public 
sector trades within LENs. The WCC addressed this via the scheme's compliance with UK 
Forestry Standard (outlined above) (Forestry Commission, 2017), negating the need for 
individual projects to address concerns about the role of companies in the national forest 
estate; e.g. see concerns around the privatisation of forestry in 2010 which prompted 
widespread public protest (Hodge and Adams, 2013). The PC balances these needs by 
retaining the ability to refuse investment by certain companies, at the discretion of its Executive 
Board, and rules regarding statements that companies can make about their investments. 
Although not currently incorporating this data, Viridian Logic identified that they had the 
capacity to build socio-demographic data into their modelling to inform the prioritisation of 
interventions. 
4.4 Legal issues 
4.4.1 Legal obligations and contractual arrangements to deliver schemes 
The legal obligations and contractual arrangements used to deliver varied across each of the 
ventures. Direct contracts between buyers and sellers were used in most cases, although there 
was evidence that there were different contractual arrangements being used within ventures. 
Direct contracts in LENs depends on the individual trade, although in the future, LENs 
envisages that funds and contracts might be pooled, rather than transacted in parallel. Within 
the WCC and the PC, as voluntary schemes, there was no requirement to purchase or take 
part, although all companies in the UK are encouraged to voluntarily offset their emissions in 
line with UK Government’s Environmental Reporting Guidelines (GERG) (HM Government, 
2019), and they can come to a net figure with WCC or PC units. To participate in the WCC and 
PC, farmers and landowners are required to sign a commitment statement, a pledge that they 
understand the requirements of the scheme and their commitments for engaging.  Typically, 
standard contracts that form the basis of a legal agreement between the supplier (i.e. 
farmer/landowner) and the purchaser were used between buyer and sellers. These were used 
within the WCC, PC, LENs and EnTrade (NIS currently has no active trades). Both the WCC 
and PC operate a shared ‘buffer’ of unsold carbon units which can be drawn upon by a project 
should there be an unanticipated loss of verified carbon credits or failure to achieve projected 
sequestration or GHG emissions savings.  This protects a buyer of verified credits, and forms 
part of the standard contract.  If a landowner is unable to deliver carbon credits sold upfront 
from their own projects, they have the choice to either compensate the buyer in cash, or provide 
them with credits from another project in the scheme.  To date there have been a very small 
number of WCC credits sold up front that were not delivered at verification. There is some 
uncertainty over what will happen to buffer credits if projects consistently deliver without 
needing to use the buffer. Technically these are owned by WCC and PC, but there have been 
discussions within the PC Executive Board about whether these would be distributed among 
projects for sale, and the size of buffer reduced if verification consistently shows the buffer is 
not required. 
Within the WCC there was evidence that some projects had also adopted conservation 
covenants in England and Wales2 and conservation burdens in Scotland3 setting out legally 
2 Conservation covenants are private and voluntary agreements between landowners and the responsible 
body (e.g. local authority) who is responsible for monitoring and enforcing the obligations of the covenant 
(Defra, 2019). 
3 Conservation burdens were established under the Title Conditions (Scotland) Act 2003. The Act codifies the 
kinds of restrictions or burdens that can be included in titles to land and property, and establishes 
conservation burdens as a voluntary instrument that can be used to protect, enhance and maintain aspects 
of natural and cultural heritage. 
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binding obligations on the land for present and subsequent land owners should land be sold. 
Although this was not a universal requirement of the scheme. Covenants and burdens in 
Scotland can only currently be agreed by ‘responsible bodies’ who hold the covenant on behalf 
of the public, and in England the National Trust is currently the only body with formal 
covenanting power. However, Part VII of the Environment Bill 2019-2020 includes provisions 
that will enable a wider range of responsible bodies to enter into and hold benefit of a 
conservation covenant. This would mean covenants would pass to future land buyers, so the 
intervention is upheld. This would in turn enable a wider range of ecosystem service buyers to 
use conservation covenants instead of, or in addition to, contracts under the WCC and PC 
(Rodgers, 2019). Schemes reported the desire for simplicity of legal arrangements, the WCC 
reported that at the outset it was thought that requiring a covenant would act as a barrier to 
participation in the scheme.  The WCC was aware of the need to ensure consistency in legal 
arrangements across the projects that it facilitates and is undergoing a review of their legal 
practices to establish the most effective approach to adopt across the scheme. In the case of 
woodland creation, the underlying presumption is that once land is converted to woodland, it 
remains woodland. Therefore, under the Forestry Act (1967) an unconditional felling licence 
from the relevant forestry authority4 is required to remove trees. This may also apply to projects 
assessed under Environmental Impact Assessment regulations, depending upon the scale and 
likely significant impact of any forestry project. This offers an additional level of protection that 
is not afforded to other landscape interventions, although whether felling (without the buyers 
approval) is still a possibility needs further exploration. 
LENs is currently developing the legal framework to support its delivery at scale. Presently, it 
operates on the basis that a group of demand-side players come together to agree to procure 
a certain proportion of assets from a landscape and form a memorandum of understanding to 
achieve this. At this stage this is not a contract, although, they are working towards a process 
where there would be a chain of contracts between all parties. LENs suggest that in the future 
a ‘regional entity’ could be established to centrally manage multiple contracts. The legal 
delivery mechanisms for NIS are under development, although, similar to LENs they identify a 
potential role for a centralised entity to manage contractual arrangements. There was also a 
recognition that contacts were required to be robust, whilst also being flexible, particularly in 
the case of long-term landscape interventions where there may be requirements for suppliers 
and/or the interventions to change over time, for example, in the case of flood risk management 
to accommodate emerging climate change challenges.  
EnTrade can facilitate a contract between buyer and seller for the delivery of ecosystem 
services. There are often several legal aspects to a facilitated trade, first, there is a legal 
agreement between the platform and farmers/landowners regarding how the EnTrade platform 
is used, this is issued at the point of registration and is an agreement defining interactions for 
the trade with which suppliers (farmers/landowners) are required to agree to. Second, farmers 
and landowners agree to take responsibility for ensuring a legal framework (i.e. approvals and 
compliance) for the delivery of the projects that they are bidding to undertake. There is then a 
contract between purchaser and supplier, this contract is signed by both parties and stored on 
the platform.  
4.4.2 Additionality 
Ensuring additionality5 was an important issue for all ventures. The PC and WCC6 have clearly 
defined rules to test for additionally, and these are outlined in Box 2. Although these are similar 
in scope, the PC differs to the WCC in that it is not creating/changing the habitat type; rather it 
is improving the condition of an existing habitat from degraded to functioning peatland. 
4 Forestry Commission in England, Scottish Forestry in Scotland, Natural Resources Wales in Wales, and 
Northern Ireland Forest Service in Ireland 
5 Additionality refers to the additional impact of interventions (English Partnerships, 2008). 
6 WCC and PC are based on CDM additionality tool (Woodland Carbon Code, 2019b). 
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The Woodland Carbon Code The Peatland Code 
1. Legal There are no laws, statutes, 
regulations, court orders, 
environmental management 
agreements, planning decisions or 
other legally binding agreements 
that require its implementation, or 
the implementation of similar 
measures that would achieve 
equivalent levels of sequestration or 
other greenhouse gas emissions 
reductions. 
1. Legal 
compliance 
There is no legal requirement 
specifying that peatland within the 
project area must be restored. 
2. Contribution 
of carbon 
finance test 
Projects are required to demonstrate 
that income from the sale of carbon 
units, over the project lifetime, 
equates to at least 15% of the 
project’s planting and establishment 
costs up to and including year 10.  
2. Financial 
feasibility 
Carbon finance shall be required to 
fund at least 15% of the project’s 
restoration and management costs 
over the project duration. 
3. Investment 
test 
The investment test is used to 
demonstrate that, without carbon 
finance, that woodland creation is 
either (a) not the most economically 
or financially attractive option for that 
area of land (e.g. woodland creation 
is profitable, but less so than grazing 
or other likely non-woodland use) or 
(b) is not economically or financially 
viable on that land at all (e.g. 
woodland creation is not profitable).  
3. Economic 
alternative 
Without carbon finance the project 
shall not be the most economically 
attractive option for that area of land, 
or shall not be economically viable 
on that land at all. 
4. Barrier test If the Test (3) is not passed, there 
may be cases where other barriers 
prevent a woodland creation project 
from taking place (i.e. economic, 
social or environmental). Test 4 aims 
to demonstrate that barriers exist 
which prevent a project going ahead 
and show how such barriers would 
be overcome (e.g. through technical 
support, re-design of financing etc.). 
4. Barriers Barriers that prevent the 
implementation of the project (legal, 
practical, social, economic or 
environmental) shall have been 
overcome. 
  
The establishment of baselines are an alternative to additionality tests. Baselines allow the 
impacts of interventions to be determined. In the case of the PC this is crucial in determining 
the impact of peatland restoration.    
LENs and NIS did not have defined measures for ensuring additionality, although both 
considered it an important issue. LENs stated that organisations are typically paying for the 
implementation of measures as opposed to outcomes per se.  Data from farmer interviews 
suggests that many farmers were already implementing LENs interventions prior to engaging, 
but as these interventions were extended using programme funds, it is likely that they were still 
additional (Coyne et al., under review). 
Box 2: Tests for Additionality 
Source: International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) (2020) and Woodland Carbon Code 
(2019b). 
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EnTrade was clear that additionality was important, especially when trades wanted to comply 
with regulatory compliance, with for example, habitat regulations or the Water Framework 
Directive (European Commission, 2019). Prior to the bidding process as part of preparatory 
work, farmers/landowners or a client typically commission surveys to establish a baseline. 
EnTrade helps to facilitate an ongoing discussion between clients and regulators around what 
constitutes valid ways of measuring environmental gain. However, there is a need to be mindful 
that regulatory baselines can shift, and anything that is or becomes a regulatory requirement 
cannot then be sold.  
4.4.3 Legally enforceable exchanges between parties 
Legal enforceability of contracts is dependent upon how contracts are drafted between the 
competent parties involved. Within LENs and NIS, supply aggregators and a proposed 'regional 
entity' (LENs) or 'NIDC' (NIS) are intended to be used to provide third party oversight of 
contractual agreements. The 'regional entities' or 'NIDCs', proposed by LENs and NIS 
respectively, act as a third-party and are suggested as a potential way to share risk between 
suppliers and buyers. These bodies would also have monitoring and evaluation responsibilities 
and be responsible for handling disputes should they arise. Current arrangements within one 
of LENs active trades, mean that the demand side actors (buyers) stipulate within the contract 
that they require third party verification of delivery.  The supplier then has to identify the 
verification body and demonstrate how this will happen. In the future, it would be desirable for 
LENs to have a list of approved verifiers/auditors. The WCC have a disputes committee 
comprised of two executive and two advisory board members that provide a formal review 
process for dealing with disputes relating to the interpretation of the standard. In the PC this is 
done by the Executive Board. 
4.4.4 Ensuring Transparency 
WCC requires projects to be checked at the outset by a third party (validation), then both the 
PC and WCC require projects to be monitored at year 5 and every 10 years thereafter 
(verification) to confirm the amount of carbon dioxide sequestered or emissions avoided. 
Validators/verifiers have to be accredited by the United Kingdom Accreditation Service (UKAS) 
to validate/verify projects to ISO 14065 and ISO 14064/3 (Greenhouse Gas accounting) and 
be competent in assessing sustainable forest management.  Presently the Soil Association and 
Organic Farmers (OFG) and Growers are accredited by UKAS to validate/verify WCC projects.  
This third-party assessment of projects ensures a robust scheme and generates buyer 
confidence. The WCC is also endorsed by the International Carbon Reduction Offset Alliance 
(ICROA), the global body for sellers of voluntary carbon credits.  This endorsement is key to 
encouraging wider market confidence in the credits generated through WCC projects.  
Smaller trades within LENs are managed through auditing requirements from the different 
outcomes and scrutiny from a regulator. For more complex future trades, governance 
structures are being developed as previously discussed. The development of a governance 
structure will enable transparent management of trades ensuring that trades strike an equitable 
balance between the different needs of demand and supply side players as well as representing 
the needs of society. Possible governance structures for LENs and the NIS are currently being 
developed and evaluated as part of a project undertaken funded by a Defra Test and Trials 
project in Cumbria.   
4.4.5 Permanence of provision of ecosystem services 
Long-term provision of services is dictated by contract length, how it is set up regarding 
maintenance costs, ongoing verification of outcomes, and maintenance of interventions. There 
is often potential to extend projects, whilst both the PC and WCC require permanent land use 
change.  There are a number of measures to promote permanence under the WCC.  Forestry 
Legislation in the UK requires an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) for deforestation 
(depending on scale and location) and an unconditional Felling Licence from the relevant 
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forestry authority.  Felling, when not part of an agreed long-term management plan for a carbon 
project, would not be considered as ‘good forestry practice’ in accordance with the UK Forestry 
Standard.  Under both the WCC and the PC, projects can only sell a portion of carbon credits 
– the remainder is stored in a shared ‘buffer’ to compensate in the event of losses.  Under the 
WCC, landowners are required to sign a statement committing to inform potential future owners 
of their commitment under the WCC, and to maintain the relevant level of carbon stock in their 
woodland for the project duration (up to 100 years) and beyond. WCC projects are available 
as a ‘constraint layer’ in publicly available land information searches so that prospective buyers 
and solicitors could ascertain a project’s status upon sale of the land.   
Within LENs, longevity is ensured by having a system of transactions which drive stable land 
management outcomes. The suite and balance of these will shift over time. This is driven by 
three potential mechanisms: first, contractual arrangements that ensure ongoing payments and 
interest in delivering outcomes, second, ensuring that real value is being procured and 
delivered, for a fair price, and finally, the potential ‘phase shift’ in farming system that may come 
about due to LENs trades, which reduces the tendency to revert back to previous practices. 
However, private finance interest may fluctuate as business and revenues change and this 
may act to destabilise the delivery of ecosystem services deliver LENs.   
4.4.6 Ensuring permanence 
Legal ‘wrappers’ such as conservation covenants or long-term management agreements7 can 
be used to make the obligations to provide ecosystem services binding on the land involved for 
long periods (in the case of management agreements) or (in the case of conservation covenant) 
in perpetuity. Ventures welcomed their use in certain situations although not universally. For 
interventions that require significant upfront investment and changes to the landscape, there 
are advantages to contractual arrangements that act to lock in demand and supply side 
interests. This also provides reassurances to demand side actors that changes made will not 
be reversed shortly after implementation. However, their implementation is not without 
technical challenges, for example, any legal arrangement will often need both the legal 
documentation and ongoing commercial interest. Conservation covenants can be a helpful tool 
but will likely bring an additional cost to the project to ensure that this is legally enforceable and 
that the agreement is monitored which will only be acceptable if ongoing maintenance did not 
affect the ongoing core business of the farm. 
7 For example, entered into by Natural England under section 7 Natural Environment and Rural Communities 
Act 2006. 
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5 Conclusions and recommendations 
The UK ecosystem market includes a number of actors categorised here as PES, or PES like, 
schemes, stakeholder engagement initiatives, trading platforms and modellers. Each plays an 
important role in channelling investment into the delivery of ES and expanding the market. For 
example, trading platforms have a vital role in driving the creation of ES marketplaces and trade 
and are an important mechanism for extending the functions, whilst stakeholder engagement 
initiatives generate commercial interest around multiple natural capital opportunities (i.e. 
beyond PES schemes, WC and PCC, which currently focus exclusively on carbon). This report 
has provided an in-depth exploration of six case study ventures operating in the UK’s voluntary 
ES market. Commonalities and differences between actors in terms of approach and 
challenges to the delivery of ES via payments were identified. Given the post-Brexit transition 
in UK agricultural policy, and greater focus on the delivery of ecosystem services within this, 
understanding how these ventures operate is important in order to support understandings of 
how public-private financing might co-exist, or indeed integrate, in order to maximise the 
potential for delivery of ES.   
The WCC and PC represent established PES schemes that are underpinned by globally 
recognised standards. The WCC is one of the world’s leading domestic carbon standards with 
a proven track record in developing carbon sequestration projects and a large pipeline of future 
projects. In both schemes, projects are initiated by supply side actors (farmers/landowners) 
that develop carbon sequestration projects. Although, they are focused on carbon 
sequestration, measures undertaken could have benefits beyond carbon and have potential to 
deliver additional functions, which could be 'stacked' in order that more of the full value of the 
land can be realised, moving towards the delivery of more multifunctional landscapes.  
In contrast, the stakeholder engagement initiatives considered in this report are in the early 
stages of development and application. They are in the process of developing and refining their 
processes and protocols, with NIS yet to road test the approach (i.e. having no active trades). 
In both instances, interventions were demand-led, and co-developed with farmers/landowners 
to ensure acceptability. Stakeholder engagement initiatives, such as LENs, guided by the 
delivery of multifunctional landscapes, can provide a variety of ES benefits that are of interest 
to a range of demand side actors within a landscape. From the supply side, this creates 
increased revenue from the land which, as the UK moves away from direct payments (CAP) 
towards ELMs (Agricultural Bill 2020) is likely to become increasingly important to 
farmers/landowners.  
Despite differences in design and scope, a number of common themes emerged from our 
synthesis which should be considered when developing ES markets. All parties identified the 
challenges associated with engaging farmers/landowners as suppliers of ES. Several factors 
were identified to improve engagement, including treating farmers/landowners as equal 
transactional partners, simplifying the engagement process, supporting engagement via project 
developers and/or aggregators, avoiding overly prescriptive options, and creating flexibility to 
recognise the individual needs of farmers in terms of interventions and payment options.  
It was apparent, across ES actors, that there is a limited consideration for the wider 
beneficiaries arising from the ES delivered by ventures, and where this was considered it was 
not quantified or marketed for sale. There is scope for broader analysis and inclusion of a wider 
range of beneficiaries to ensure the multifunctionality of landscapes. Despite adding additional 
layers of complexity to transactions, this will help to ensure that landscapes are not managed 
to realise a narrow range of ES benefits, avoid outcomes being dictated by corporate need and 
reduce the likelihood of ecosystem service trade-offs. There is a role for the integration of 
modelling data in order to identify beneficiaries and possible co-benefits that can be derived 
from a landscape and interventions, these appear to be 'advanced' elements that are not 
regularly included due to the overall immaturity of the ecosystem markets. 
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Prices and values for ES were negotiated between demand and supply side actors (individuals 
or aggregators) based on market demand and willingness to pay. This presents potential for 
power asymmetries, and there was a recognised role for aggregators to support farmer/ 
landowners in the negotiation process to avoid this. LENs and NIS identified a role for 
independent bodies to manage financial and contractual arrangements. Similarities to Coasian 
bargaining can be seen in LENs and NIS approaches, whereby parties strive towards a more 
Pareto efficient allocation through negotiation rather than other more familiar instruments (such 
as Command and Control regulation, or Pigovian tax/subsidy). Bargaining is not without its 
drawbacks, and may be hampered by high transaction costs (i.e. the negotiation can be 
expensive, particularly where many parties are involved), a lack of bargaining culture, and 
unclear property rights. However, trading platforms assist here, and act to increase demand for 
ES by opening up the market and increasing the availability of funds for ES. On the supply side, 
they increase the autonomy of farmers/landowners in the sale of assets from their land, and 
increases competition between suppliers for the provision of ES. On the demand side it helps 
to ensure the real market value of ES interventions is determined, as well as reducing the 
likelihood of power asymmetries in negotiations. Trading platforms have an important role to 
play in opening up the UK's ES market, increasing investment and opportunities for 
farmers/landowners to trade their environmental assets, which is going to become more 
important as the UK leaves the CAP.  
Contractual obligations were primarily captured via standard contracts between demand side 
actors and suppliers. A need to limit complexity in legal arrangement was recognised, with 
concerns voiced that complex legal obligations could be detrimental to engagement. Equally, 
contracts were required to be robust, whilst also having flexibility to account for changes in 
supply. There were currently no contractual arrangements to account for how/if interventions 
are maintained after the contracted period or if obligations are tied to the land if land is sold 
during the duration of a contract period, although for the WCC and the PC contract lengths 
secured permanency. Conservation covenants (England) and conservation burdens (Scotland) 
could be useful in situations where significant upfront investment and changes to the landscape 
are required, providing reassurances to demand side actors that interventions would not easily 
be reversed and concerns around enforceability and additional costs to the projects identified. 
Contractual obligations should also build in mechanisms for enforcement and dispute 
resolution. The WCC and the PCC have dedicated mechanisms for handling disputes, which 
are important mechanisms for building confidence and transparency between trading partners. 
Ensuring additionality (i.e. that the intervention would not have occurred without investment) 
was important for all actors, although different actors had different approaches to ensuring this. 
The WCC and the PC have clearly defined measures and rules to ensure projects demonstrate 
additionally. LENs and NIS have less structured approaches to quantifying additionality, 
although, still recognised its importance. There appeared to be a balance between ensuring 
additionality and investor confidence, whilst also not stifling interest and investment in ES.  
The research has identified a range of mechanisms that are aimed at delivering landscapes 
that provide multiple benefits to a diversity of beneficiaries. To move towards the enhanced 
delivery of ecosystem services in the UK there are two potential options. First, ventures could 
explore the potential of  ‘stacking’ outcomes in order to realise the full value of the land, or 
second, the potential to integrate schemes is considered. The WCC, PC and LENs represent 
very different types of natural capital mechanisms however, there is scope for integration which 
could increase the amount of funding available for sustainable landscape management, as well 
as broadening the range of outcomes and the scale at which these can be delivered and avoid 
duplication, including the ability to design into schemes a range of co-benefits. Whilst 
integration could be highly beneficial, it would not be without challenge. This would include the 
difficulties associated with integrating ventures at different levels of development (for example, 
integration would need to ensure that rigorous standards (i.e. WCC) are maintained) 
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and the complexity that this adds to the system. Whilst several different ES ventures have been 
interviewed as part of this report; there is scope for further interviews to be conducted with 
additional representatives of the existing ventures and with other public/private finance 
initiatives, both in the UK and internationally.  
A number of open questions emerged from the synthesis that need to be explored by future 
research. This would in turn support the development of the ES market and be important in any 
attempts to integrate private PES initiatives or creating other public/private partnerships. Future 
research should consider: (1) management structures; (2) the need for quantification of societal 
benefits; (3) building the evidence base regarding environmental impacts of initiatives; (4) 
payment mechanisms; and (5) legal issues. These are elaborated below:  
(1) Difference in management, decision making and governance structures emerged across 
the ventures. It was not possible to draw conclusions around which approach was best. In part 
this was because of the differences in level of development of the respective ventures, which 
varied considerably from the NIS in theoretical development to established schemes like the 
PC and WCC, with active projects.  It was, therefore, difficult to draw conclusions around which 
were most effective approaches. It would, however, be useful to explore best practice, 
understand the advantages of the different management structures and the challenges that 
they present in terms of governance. This would be fundamental in supporting any future 
attempts to integrate private and public investment in natural capital. 
(2) The social distribution of the ecosystem services delivered appeared not to be considered 
in detail across all ventures. This may be due to an emphasis on carbon, where the benefits of 
net carbon emission reduction are global, not local. There was some misinterpretation of this 
being the consideration of the balance between demand and supply side actors rather than 
assessments of the broader impacts of the ES delivered by ventures on wider beneficiaries. A 
part of this was covered via compliance with standards. However, there is a need for research 
on how social distributive effects (including direct and indirect benefits and externalities) of the 
ecosystem services delivered from interventions could be measured in an understandable and 
implementable way, as an approach seen to be overly complicated or resource intensive may 
result in a limited uptake. Thus there is a need to consider how best to include social distribution 
of benefits assessment in ES ventures (such as promoted in HM Government’s (2018) Green 
Book; in this respect the role of modelling merits further investigation.  
(3) While there is still a need to improve the evidence base underpinning carbon sequestration 
and emission avoidance estimation in the WCC and PC, these schemes are comparably more 
scientifically tested, and include internal risk mitigation (in the form of a ‘buffer’ of carbon 
credits), whereas NIS and LENs require more work to build a robust approach to quantification 
and valuation of ES they deliver.  
(4) Payments for the delivery of ecosystems services was shown to vary according to types of 
interventions/measures and they were being paid in a variety of ways (i.e. upfront, annually 
and revenue payments overtime). Future research could usefully explore the utility of different 
approaches, developing a suite of solutions, rather than a ‘one size fits all’ approach. 
(5) More insights are also needed to understand the legal underpinnings of all ventures, 
including greater understanding of the nature of the contracts, and particularly whether they 
are legally binding and enforceable, and through what mechanisms (e.g. do they include 
arbitration or breach clauses?). There is also a need to consider the potential implications of 
the UK’s post-Brexit environmental policy on the delivery of public/private financing of 
ecosystem service schemes (for example, the new Environment Bill 2019-2020 aiming to 
change English law to create binding conservation covenants). There is a need to consider 
which legal instruments, including covenants, are most likely to ensure contracted services are 
additional and verifiable. 
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